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Abstract 
Production requiring licensing groups of complementary patents implements a 
coordination game among patent holders, who can price patents by choosing among 
combinations of fixed and royalty fees. Summed across patents, these fees become the 
total producer cost of the package of patents. Royalties, because they function as 
excise taxes, add to marginal costs, resulting in higher prices and reduced quantities of 
the downstream product and lower payoffs to the patent holders. Using fixed fees 
eliminates this inefficiency but yields a more complex coordination game in which there 
are multiple equilibria, which are very fragile in that small mistakes can lead the 
downstream firm to not license the technology, resulting in inefficient outcomes. We 
report on a laboratory market investigation of the efficiency effects of coordinated 
pricing of patents in a patent pool. We find that pool-like pricing agreements can yield 
fewer coordination failures in the pricing of complementary patents. 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction and Literature 
In some research and development (R&D) areas, technical advances have resulted in 
the issuance of numerous patents, each constituting an essential element of a larger 
information base. Consequently, obtaining access to innovations requires licensing 
increasingly larger sets of intellectual property rights. To commercialize an innovation 
may well require simultaneous dealings with as many different agents as there are 
patented elements.1 Requiring multiple patent rights to produce a product creates two 
sets of issues: the potential for holdup problems (a patent holder refusing to license) 
and the potential compounding effect of multiple license fees set as royalties. Obtaining 
numbers of essential patents could lead to higher prices and/or reduced access to 
upstream information bundles, owing to increased transactions costs. It could also 
reallocate rents among individual elements of the larger information package required to 
bring biomedical products to market, leading to reduced incentives for downstream 
research.  
 
Royalty fees are an inherently inefficient mechanism for pricing patents. In effect, such 
fees constitute an excise tax on downstream production, shifting the marginal cost of 
the good upward and resulting in higher prices and lower quantities for the consumers 
of the final product. The problem is compounded when a set of patents is required to 
produce the good. Each patent holder sets a use fee (a royalty), and since each of 
these acts as an excise tax on the downstream producer, the cumulative effect of 
several fees being charged (what Lemley and Shapiro [2007] refer to as “patent 
stacking”) is a higher cost of producing the good and a smaller quantity of output. The 
welfare losses consist of the sum of the patent holder’s lost returns, the lost profits of 
the downstream firm, and the consumers’ loss of surplus from the final product. 
 
When there is a single downstream purchaser of the technology, or when patent holders 
can price discriminate, one solution to this dilemma is for patent holders to charge fixed 
fees rather than royalty rates for the use of the patents. Such fixed fees will not affect 
the marginal cost of the downstream firm, and so the welfare losses enumerated by 
Shapiro (2006) will not arise. In this case, the existence of multiple patent holders would 
introduce coordination problems, but the pricing mechanism itself would not introduce 
inefficiencies. Coordination, however, may prove difficult, and if the patent holders are 
unable to coordinate strategies, at least two types of inefficiency may result. The first 
type arises if the combined fees are sufficient to discourage the downstream firm from 
purchasing the technology. Here potential consumers of the final product fail to realize 
the resulting surplus, and the firms (including those holding the patents) fail to realize 
potential profits. The second type can arise if the patent holders anticipate the inability 
to coordinate on their pricing and, therefore, invest fewer resources attempting to 
innovate. 
 
It is clear (see Merges 1996, 2004a, 2004b; Lerner, Tirole, and Strojwas 2003) that 
successful pools for the purpose of licensing intellectual property rights (IPR) have 
emerged over time. As Merges (2004a) suggests, repeat players learn to develop 
strategies and take steps that allow business to be transacted, and within a dynamic 
marketplace, excessively rigid rules and institutions reduce efficiency unnecessarily. 
Bittlingmayer (1988) describes a case (aircraft manufacturers in 1917) in which the 
industry was encouraged to form a pool to facilitate the development of aircraft needed 
for World War I. The open question is whether the pools that have emerged achieve 
efficient pricing of the IPR. This question can be resolved only through empirical 
investigation because it is inherently behavioral. While there are case studies of patent 
pools, there are few studies reporting the terms of these agreements. 
 
A solution to the potential coordination problems arising from complementary patents in 
current technology might be to encourage the formation of patent pools or other 
collective property rights organizations. While this solution has the obvious advantage of 
speeding the learning process discussed above, such organizations by themselves can 
easily slip into collusive practices if they serve as a means to reduce competition and 
could fall victim to antitrust proceedings. However, many analysts (for example, Kato 
2004; Shapiro 2001) believe that allowing holders of complementary patents to 
undertake monopoly pricing practices through pooling or other arrangements would 
result in lower prices for the package of complementary patents and therefore lead to 
welfare gains. Current policy appears to endorse this approach (Clark et al. 2001). 
Patent pools may also allow the avoidance of various holdup problems. Merges (2001, 
2004a, 2004b), Gilbert (2004), and Lerner and Tirole (2004) describe the history of 
patent pools and analyze their impact on competition among patent holders. Bessen 
(2004) and Shapiro (2006) provide discussion of the holdup problem. 
 
To investigate the scope for pools to avoid potential coordination failures in the 
complementary patent setting, we begin by constructing a three-player game. The game 
consists of two profit-maximizing upstream holders of strictly complementary patents 
and a downstream firm that requires the technology to produce a final product. The 
patent holders choose a combination of fixed and royalty fees in a full-information 
environment. In equilibrium, the patent holders forgo use of the royalty, which would 
distort the downstream firm’s output, extracting rents through the use of fixed fees. As 
such, all rents theoretically accrue to the patent holders, leaving the downstream 
monopolist with only sufficient incentives to produce. Multiple equilibria exist because 
only the sum of the fixed fees matters to the downstream firm. Each Nash equilibrium is 
equally efficient and identical to the solution arrived at by a patent pool that successfully 
emulates the behavior of a single upstream seller. This simple game captures the 
essential elements of the licensing of perfectly complementary patents and yields 
testable predictions. 
 
In the absence of sufficient field data, we test the predictions of our model with data 
from a laboratory experiment designed to investigate the occurrence of coordination 
failures and options for improving efficiency. The patent holders are allowed to price 
their patents using fixed fees or royalties, and the information exchange among patent 
holders, a surrogate for public policy toward collusive behavior, is varied as 
experimental treatments. Patent holders choose patent prices that, when added 
together, become the cost to a buyer of a bundle of essential patents. A downstream 
buyer then compares the cost of the bundle with expected revenues and determines 
whether or not to produce the final product the patent bundle enables. 
We find that players generally are not able to improve their pricing strategies over time 
and continue to coordinate poorly in the absence of facilitating mechanisms. The 
players set the royalty higher than the theory predicts and the fixed fee correspondingly 
lower. The result is that the patent holders earn suboptimal rents. The subjects obtain 
more efficient outcomes in the cheap-talk (information-sharing) regime and do best in 
our simplified pool regime, although in no circumstance do they fully achieve the 
theoretical (Nash) outcome. The class of failures arising when the monopolist rejects 
the patent offers because of violation of the nonnegative profit constraint is also affected 
by the treatment variables. Ours may be the first empirical evidence of the desirability of 
patent pools in a setting in which the patent holders are unable to coordinate their fees 
to maximize the return to R&D activity. 
 
2. Theory 
There are three players: Firm 1, Firm 2, and Downstream. Firms 1 and 2 hold patents, 
and Downstream requires both patents in order to produce widgets. There are no other 
widget producers—Downstream will be a monopolist if it sells widgets, and entry is 
precluded through enforcement of exclusive patent rights.9 The inverse demand curve 
for widgets is 
 
 
 
Given that Downstream has access to the patented technologies, it can produce 
widgets at a constant marginal cost: TC p cQ. It is assumed that a 1 c, which implies 
that the monopolist should operate. It is convenient to have notation for the profits that 
would be earned if Downstream did not have to pay for either patent. Straightforward 
calculations show that the standard monopoly quantity and profits are, respectively, Q p 
(a _ c)/2b and Pmax p (a _ c)2/4b. 
 
Firms 1 and 2 can each charge a two-part tariff (a fixed fee and per-unit royalties) for 
the use of their patents.10 The reservation profit of each player is zero. Thus, if the fees 
set by the firms do not allow Downstream to earn nonnegative profit, then Downstream 
will not purchase access to either technology. The timing of the game is as follows: 
 
Stage 1. Firms 1 and 2 simultaneously set fixed fees and royalties. That is, Firms 
1 and 2 simultaneously choose (F , R ) and (F , R ), where F ≥ 0 and 1 1 2 2 I R ≥ 0 for i 
p 1, 2.  
Stage 2. Downstream either accepts both offers or rejects both offers. 
Stage 3. If Downstream rejects both offers, then each player earns a reservation 
profit equal to zero. If Downstream accepts both offers, it must decide how many 
widgets to produce. 
 
It is optimal for Downstream to accept the offers as long as the fees for the patents 
allow it to earn nonnegative profits after solving the following: 
 
 
 
At an interior solution, the optimum quantity is Q* p (a _ R _ R _ c)/2b. 1 2 Substituting 
this value into the expression for profits yields 
 
 
 
The profits of the downstream firm are P*(F , R , F , R ) p max{0, P(F , R , 1 1 2 2 1 1 F , 
R )}. When there is no risk of confusion, the arguments of P(F , R , F , R ) 2 2 1 1 2 2 
and P*(F , R , F , R ) are suppressed. It is also convenient to write P(F, R , F, 1 1 2 2 i i j 
R ) and P*(F, R , F, R ), where i ( j. This should not cause confusion since j i i j j P(F , R 
, F , R ) p P(F , R , F , R ). 
 
Subgame perfection requires that Downstream reject both offers if P ! 0 and accept both 
offers if P ≥ 0. It is assumed that Downstream accepts both offers when P p 0, even 
though it is indifferent. 
 
We can write the profits of Firm i, denoted p, as a function of (F, R , F, i i i j R ). 
Specifically, 
 
 
 
Firm i’s best response is the pair (Fbr(F, R ), Rbr(F, R )) that maximizes p(F, i j j i j j i I R 
, F, R ) while holding (F, R ) constant. When P(0, 0, F, R ) ≤ 0, Firm j’s fees i j j j j j j are 
so large that Downstream will necessarily reject the offers unless Firm I charges no fee. 
It follows that i’s best response is not unique: Firm i will earn no profit regardless of the 
fees it charges. However, for concreteness, we define (Fbr(F, R ), Rbr(F, R )) p (0, 0) 
whenever P*(0, 0, F, R ) p 0. 
 
Lemma 1. If either patent holder (or both) plays a best response, then Downstream’s 
profits equal zero. 
 
Proof. Suppose not, so that ( br( , ), br( , ), , ) 1 0, which P* F F R R F R F R 1 2 2 1 2 2 
2 2 implies that ( br( , ), br( , ), , . Then Firm 1 could increase P F F R R F R F R ) 1 0 1 
2 2 1 2 2 2 2 its payoff by increasing its fixed fee by _ p ( ( , ), ( , ), , )1 br br PF F R R F 
R F R 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 0 without causing Downstream to reject. It follows that the choice 
Fbr(F , R ), 1 2 2 Rbr(F , R ) cannot be a best response. The argument for Firm 2 is 
identical. In other words, Lemma 1 shows that it is never optimal to leave rents on the 
table. As long as Downstream is capable of earning positive profits, one of the patent 
holders would be better off charging a larger fixed fee. 
 
Lemma 2. Firm i’s best response to any (F, R ) is to charge no royalty and j j a fixed fee 
that leaves Downstream with no profit. That is, for all (F, R ), we j j have Rbr (F , R ) p 0 
and Fbr (F , R ) p P* (0, 0, F , R ) p max {0, (a _ R _ i j j i j j j j j c)2 /4b _ F} for all (F, R ). 
 
Proof. As discussed above, if (0, 0, , ) p 0, then br( , ) p 0 and P* F R R F R j j i j j Fbr(F, 
R ) p 0. If P*(0, 0, F, R ) 1 0, lemma 1 implies that (a _ Rbr _ R _ c)2/4b _ Fbr _ F p 0. 
Therefore, we can use this condition to substitute out the i j fixed fee from Firm i’s 
objective, which is then 
 
 
 
The first-order condition reduces to _R /2b p 0, which implies that Rbr(F , i ij R ) p 0: 
 
 
 
Using Rbr(F , R ) p 0 along with lemma 1 implies 
 
 
 
Given that royalties (further) distort the output decision of Downstream, they are an 
inefficient means of extracting surplus. Hence, is not surprising that it is never a best 
response to choose a positive royalty. We do not prove the next proposition, as it 
follows immediately from lemmas 1 and 2. 
 
Proposition 1. The terms (F*, R*) and (F*, R*) constitute a Nash equilib- 1 1 2 2 rium if 
and only if (i) R* p R* p 0 and (ii) F* _ F* p (a _ c)2/4b p Pmax. 
 
According to proposition 1, there exist a multiplicity of equilibria. Furthermore, the 
equilibria cannot be Pareto ranked since in any equilibrium in which Firm 2 receives a 
higher fee, Firm 1 receives a lower fee since F* p Pmax _ 1 F*. Facing such settings, 
the players are often depicted as utilizing focal points 2 to select outcomes from the set 
of Nash equilibria (Sefton 1999). Given the symmetry of the patent-pricing game, one 
such focal equilibrium is the symmetric one in which each firm extracts half of 
Downstream’s profits via the fixed fee (F* p F* p Pmax/2). 
 
Whether or not firms can coordinate on a given equilibrium, symmetric or other, is 
ultimately an empirical question. The discontinuity of the payoff functions potentially 
makes the coordination failures very costly. For any given F, j the payoff to both firms is 
zero if firm i charges F 1 Pmax _ F since Downstream i j will not purchase either 
technology in this case. Similarly, if the fixed fees charged are such that F p F p Pmax, 
any positive royalty drives the profits of the patent 1 2 holders down to zero. Hence, 
even the slightest coordination failure or mistake can have dramatic consequences. 
 
3. Experimental Design and Hypotheses 
The task of the patent holders is to choose patent-pricing strategies that achieve two 
ends: provide the necessary incentive for the monopolist to produce an optimal quantity 
by forgoing the use of a royalty and choose the fixed fees such that their sum exhausts 
monopoly rents. In our experimental setting, human subjects were assigned the role of 
patent holders, and the behavior of the downstream firm (the monopolist) was 
simulated.  The assumption enforced by the simulated behavior was a simple profit rule. 
If the patent holders set their combined prices to the downstream firm such that its 
profits would be strictly negative, the monopolist did not purchase the patents and did 
not produce. In that case, the patent holders earned no income in the round. If the 
downstream firm did purchase the patents and produce the final product, the patent 
holders’ earnings consisted of the fixed fee and the royalty charges they chose to 
implement. All of this information was conveyed via the instructions provided to the 
subjects through several computer screens. 
 
As these were computerized experiments, subjects interacted with a computer interface 
that provided them with the necessary instructions and information and elicited their 
choices. The fixed fee was entered via a numeric keypad presented on the screen, and 
the royalty was entered via the choice of a row or column in a game matrix. The 
interface allowed the subjects to enter the potential choices of the person with whom 
they were paired and to observe the outcomes under alternative scenarios. As these 
scenario values were entered, the subjects were informed of the payoffs that would 
result if they played their choice and their partner played the hypothetical choice. The 
subjects could also observe the resulting profits to the downstream monopolist for each 
scenario. This feature of the experimental design reinforces the interdependence that 
exists in the naturally occurring setting. The subjects were free to investigate alternative 
strategies until they decided which one they wished to choose. The interface reminded 
the subjects that they had limited time (3 minutes) to make a decision and provided an 
on-screen warning when 15 seconds remained in the round. The software imposed a 
zero-price outcome on a subject who did not submit a decision prior to time expiring. 
 
The experiment implemented a game of complete information, as developed in the 
theory. Thus, the subjects were informed of the downstream monopolist’s profits for 
each possible combination of fixed fees and royalties. The game was symmetric—
payoffs to each subject for a given fee and royalty were identical. The subjects were told 
that they would be paired with the same person each round. Subjects were not told the 
number of rounds in the session. In all sessions the subjects read through the 
instructions on the computer screen, which showed the interface and an explanation of 
its operation. Subjects were given the opportunity 
 
Table 1 Experimental Treatments 
 
 
to ask questions about the procedures and to complete a number of practice or training 
rounds, after which further procedural questions were addressed. Each subject 
participated in only one session (treatment). The interface allowed subjects to review 
past performance, including the decisions of the subject, the person with whom they 
were paired, and the resulting payoffs. 
 
The experimental treatments in this simple setting are shown in Table 1. Since the 
subjects faced a potentially difficult coordination problem, to provide a baseline setting 
we ran our first treatment, T1 Royalty, in which the subjects could choose only a royalty 
to license the patent. The second treatment, T2 Fixed Fee, introduced the fixed fee 
along with the royalty.  
 
In a coordination game setting, such as this one, there are several Nash equilibria, 
which cannot be Pareto ranked. Since the players can benefit from coordinating 
strategies, there is the potential for cheap talk to improve the outcome by providing 
opportunities for informing strategy choices and encouraging the players to play the 
strategy that yields the equilibrium with the largest payoff. This raises the potential for 
communication to facilitate coordination on pricing even though such communication is 
not binding on the parties. The third treatment, T3 Cheap Talk, allows for this possibility. 
 
We implemented cheap talk in a manner similar to that used in other experiments (see, 
for example, Sefton 1999; Alm and McKee 2004). After six nonpayment practice rounds 
were completed, the subjects were given 4 minutes to discuss the experiment among 
the entire group. Since subjects were never informed of the identity of the person with 
whom they were paired, the discussion could inform the subjects of general principles of 
the decision task but could not facilitate explicit agreements. Six practice rounds 
allowed the subjects considerable experience with the setting prior to the discussion 
period. The experimenter monitored the subjects’ discussions only to provide reminders 
of time remaining. After this discussion, the subjects returned to their carrels, and the 
actual rounds of the session began. There was no further opportunity for discussion. 
 
Finally, formal coordination among patent holders (for example, through the formation of 
a patent pool) would be expected to lead to efficient patent pricing. That is, the logical 
next step beyond cheap talk is a joint decision setting. We implemented this as the 
fourth treatment, T4 Pool, where the subjects were paired and the pairs assigned to a 
single carrel. The subjects each had their own terminal in the carrel in which they 
entered their patent-pricing decisions. The subjects had full view of each other’s 
computer screens and could discuss strategies and easily monitor the decisions of the 
person with whom they were paired for the session. 
 
4. Results 
A total of 102 subjects participated, with each making 20 or 25 decisions (rounds). In 
Table 2 we provide definitions of the variables used in subsequent analysis, and in 
Table 3 we report raw results for the behavioral metrics we constructed. We predict that 
each metric will improve as we introduce coordination-facilitating mechanisms as 
treatments (T3 Cheap Talk and T4 Pool). The simplest setting, T1 Royalty, serves as a 
benchmark of the subject’s understanding of the decision setting. Here, the players 
coordinated on strategies yielding results quite close to the Nash equilibrium. The 
predicted royalty rate (index) is .67 (see note 10), and we see that in the last 10 rounds 
the subjects achieved an average royalty index of .61 for each pair of patent holders. 
Royalties are inefficient means of pricing patents, and this is demonstrated by the 
relatively low scores for the efficiency index in T1 Royalty. 
 
Introducing the fixed fee option has the potential to generate efficient pricing, and we 
examine in detail the results from those experimental settings in which both a fixed fee 
and a royalty could have been charged. The costliest coordination failure has the 
monopolist buying neither patent, the result being zero profits to each patent holder. 
This class of failure arises when the combined price of the two patents is such that the 
downstream firm incurs a loss by purchasing the patents. The failure rate is highest for 
the treatment in which nonbinding discussion was allowed (T3 Cheap Talk). As 
expected, the failure rate is lowest for the collusion setting (T4 Pool), which may 
suggest that the failures in T3 Cheap Talk are not due to a failure to understand the 
pricing setting. Rather, it 
 
Table 2 Variables and Definitions 
 
 
is plausible that these failures are due to the inability to enforce the agreements that 
emerged through cheap talk. 
 
It is optimal for the patent holders to set the royalty at zero and use only the fixed fee to 
extract the monopoly rents. The Nash equilibrium has a zero royalty being charged by 
both patent holders (a royalty index equal to zero). Examination of the aggregate results 
(Table 3) shows that the royalty index is greater than zero for all four treatments but 
decreases as we provided opportunities for the patent holders to communicate (T3 
Cheap Talk) and to collude (T4 Pool). The index is bounded at zero, the predicted 
value, so errors can occur in only one direction. The performance in T4 Pool can be 
judged to be quite good in light of the theory. 
 
The downstream monopoly right derives from the exclusive use of the patent rights, and 
it follows that the patent holders will be able to extract the available rents—profits flow to 
the scarce resources, the patent rights. The patent holders are predicted to set the fixed 
fees such that the sum of the fees will just exhaust the monopoly profits.20 Thus, theory 
predicts that the fixed fee and the efficiency index will each equal 1.0. Examination of 
the data reported in Table 3 clearly shows that this is not observed. The fixed fee index 
is below .5 for all but the T4 Pool treatment. Similarly, the efficiency index is well below 
1.0 except for the T4 Pool treatment. The indices improve as the experimental 
treatments  
 
Table 3 Results for Performance Indices 
 
 
successively introduce facilitating mechanisms, but we do not observe the levels 
required for efficient pricing. 
 
The coordination problem facing the patent holders is complicated by the fact that there 
are two pricing vehicles. Players must also overcome a natural tendency to seek to 
diversify by setting each vehicle at a positive value. Cheap talk has been shown to be 
useful in coordination games, and we expect that it is useful here. The results in Table 3 
provide some support for this conjecture. With the opportunity to engage in cheap talk, 
the patent holders were better able to coordinate on the equilibrium predicted by the 
theory. However, T3 Cheap Talk does not fare as well in comparison with T4 Pool. As 
we would expect, collusion among the patent holders provides the best opportunity for 
the coordination on the optimal joint fixed fee and royalty in order to exhaust the 
monopoly profits. The aggregate results in Table 3 suggest that the sort of collusion 
associated with a patent pool may be able to resolve the coordination problem. The 
royalty index approaches zero in this treatment, while the efficiency and monopolist 
quantity indices approach one. The fixed fee index falls short of the predicted level even 
in the presence of the facilitating opportunities. We check whether the results improve if 
we focus on the last 10 rounds of the session. In general, the results are unchanged. 
Learning through repeated play does not, in itself, facilitate coordination. 
 
We can learn more about individual behavior from econometric investigation of the data. 
Since the data are generated by observations across a set of individuals over a number 
of rounds, we have a panel data set. We analyze the data using a generalized equation 
estimation model (see Liang and Zeger 1986). Our model uses the probit link function 
and binomial distribution family, which constrains predicted values for the dependent 
variable to be in the [0, 1] interval defined by our construction of the indices. We include 
as regressors in the model dummy variables corresponding to treatment conditions and 
round-specific indicator variables. The errors are corrected for clustering on subjects. 
The results for the  
Table 4 Panel Estimations 
 
 
models estimated to explain our performance metrics are reported in Table 4, with 
coefficients corresponding to the round-specific indicator variables suppressed for 
compactness. 
 
The regression results presented in Table 4 provide a more comprehensive look at the 
effects of the cheap-talk and pool settings on patent-pricing behavior and market 
efficiency. For this analysis we include only the data from those treatments in which the 
subjects could set both a royalty and a fixed fee. The coefficients on both Cheap Talk 
and Patent Pool are generally significantly different from zero. The more interesting 
comparison is the relative effects of the treatments. The marginal effects of the pool 
setting are uniformly greater, and these differences are statistically significant at the .10 
level, or better, for all indices. While cheap talk may facilitate coordination, introducing 
the pool is the only treatment that yields noticeable effects on the efficiency in the 
market for intellectual property rights. Our cheap-talk setting is comparatively weak in 
that no further opportunities for discussion were offered during the progress of the 
experiment. The effect is smaller than expected when compared with results in prior 
applications in coordination games. It is also possible that cheap talk is simply 
insufficient in more complex settings such as one requiring multiple (royalty and fixed 
fee) decisions. 
 
5. Discussion 
It may be argued that our patent pool setting is contrived. All players knew the potential 
profits of the downstream firm, a situation unlikely to arise in the naturally occurring 
setting. Second, the size of our patent pool was exogenous and relatively small. Third, 
the patent holders were identical in terms of their investment in R&D (here normalized 
to zero). Fourth, our downstream market was extremely simplified; there was no value 
added at the downstream end. We address these points. 
 
It is not necessary that the players know the profits of the downstream firm for the 
patent holders to coordinate on the use and size of the fixed fees. It is necessary only 
that the parties agree as to the assessment of these profits. Overestimating the rents 
that can be extracted may lead the upstream firms to charge fees that are rejected by 
the downstream firm. However, this would be true for a single upstream patent holder 
and is not specifically a coordination failure. 
 
The size of the patent pool is an important issue not addressed here but is a worthy 
topic for future research. A larger number of complementary patent holders should have 
greater difficulty coordinating in the absence of a patent pool. Even with complementary 
patents, the most favorable argument for pools, the potential exists for the pool to exert 
monopoly power through the use of tie-in sales and full-line-forcing contracts (Burstein 
1960). 
 
Unequal levels of investment can further complicate the coordination problem that is at 
the heart of the pool’s task. In a formal patent pool with multiple players, there must be 
a set of fairly rigid rules. A necessary rule governs the division of the revenues from 
patent licensing. As Libecap and Wiggins (1985) show, disagreement over division of 
the rents severely compromises agreements even when substantial private 
inefficiencies could be avoided. In the patent pool, a potential principle might be to 
divide the rents equally since each patent is an essential input—all have equal value at 
the margin. However, the R&D costs may differ substantially, and a revenue-sharing 
rule that ignores the differential investment will not encourage R&D in the costly 
complements. Such division will be more likely agreed upon in the presence of a patent 
pool. 
 
Finally, in our market, the downstream firm served merely as a distributor of the 
technology embedded in the patents, with no distinct contribution to command rents. In 
the Buchanan and Yoon (2000) and Shapiro (2001) models, the downstream firm was 
constructed differently, implying multiple uses for the technology, such that adding 
access to the technology led to a welfare gain. It would be interesting to expand the role 
of the downstream firm or firms such that this market can add to social welfare in a 
manner similar to the model in Buchanan and Yoon (2000). 
 
6. Conclusion 
Academics and policymakers alike have suggested that increased coordination among 
holders of complementary patents, including the formation of patent pools, can improve 
welfare. Our experiments provide empirical evidence supporting this view. In particular, 
we find that coordination failures can greatly decrease efficiency and that institutions 
improving coordination can help combat this problem. 
 
Our observed coordination failures in the setting where communication was not 
permitted raise concerns regarding the two classes of inefficiency noted in our 
introduction. First, setting positive royalties results in distortions in the downstream 
market. Second, suboptimal rent extraction implies a lower return to R&D and less 
investment. Subsidies to R&D activity may be viewed as a correction of the latter, but 
such policy responses will be second best in that the initial distortion remains. A first-
best solution would facilitate coordination among patent holders. As such, our results 
provide evidence in support of permitting collusion among patent holders such that 
coordination failures are avoided. Our experimental investigations demonstrate the 
difficulty that holders of complementary patents have in coordinating their pricing 
strategies. Such difficulties can be overcome through the use of collusion on pricing. To 
the extent that a patent pool can facilitate such collusion, the pools would provide a 
benefit. 
 
The “patent race” stage game has been extensively analyzed (see Taylor [1995], 
Fullerton et al. [1999], and Zizzo [2002] for the case in which a single patent is sufficient 
for production of a good). Solving the sequential game by backward induction to 
determine the best-response investment in R&D requires that the prospective patent 
seekers know the yield (expected value) from the resulting patent. The yield depends on 
the full license price for the patent. Absent the ability of patent holders to set their prices 
to maximize profits, the level of R&D activity will be reduced. Finding that patent holders 
are unable to jointly arrive at rent-extracting patent prices calls into question whether the 
results of the single-patent literature can be extended to the case in which patents are 
complements. As our experimental results demonstrate, coordination failures are less 
likely to arise when patent holders can jointly set use fees as they would, for example, if 
they belonged to a patent pool. This institutional structure would help the patent holders 
achieve the sorts of payoffs available in the single-patent case. Thus, one possible 
policy response to this coordination problem is to facilitate coordination among the 
holders of complementary patents by allowing them to form patent pools. 
 
While our empirical evidence is obtained from the decisions of subjects in a laboratory 
setting, the basic decision making is not dissimilar from that encountered in the naturally 
occurring setting. Our interface provided subjects with the ability to investigate 
outcomes under alternative scenarios of conjectures of the behavior of the other patent 
holder. In particular, the interface reminded our subjects of the consequence of setting 
the joint fee for the use of the complementary patents so high that the downstream 
monopolist does not license the patents and so the return is zero.25 However, this is 
the patent-pricing setting faced in the field where patent holders have different means of 
licensing intellectual property, including fixed fees and royalties. Our laboratory 
experiments suggest that profit-seeking agents can coordinate licensing arrangements 
in complicated situations fairly effectively with the opportunity to set prices jointly. In the 
case of strictly complementary patents, the gains arising from permitting collusion 
(measured as market efficiency) appear to be substantial, and the extreme examples of 
coordination failure are avoided. 
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